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The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration 
Act of 1984, commonly known 
as the Hatch–Waxman Act, aims 
to strike a balance between the 
innovation incentives provided by 
patents and the greater access 
provided by low-cost generic 
drugs. The legislation, which re-
lies in part on an explicit link be-
tween the Food and Drug Ad-
ministration (FDA) drug-approval 
process and the U.S. patent sys-
tem, has been controversial, par-
ticularly because of the ways in 
which firms producing brand-
name drugs have exploited that 
link to delay market entry of ge-
nerics as long as possible. Now, 
the tactical landscape has shifted 
again, with a recently decided Su-
preme Court case, Caraco Pharma-
ceutical Laboratories v. Novo Nordisk.
Under current FDA regula-
tions, the developer of a brand-
name drug must submit all pat-
ents that it deems to cover the 
drug to the FDA for publication 
in the agency’s Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations — the so-called Or-
ange Book. Before marketing a 
generic version of a drug, the ge-
nerics manufacturer must certify 
that all Orange Book patents for 
the brand-name product are in-
valid, are not infringed by the 
generic product, or have expired. 
Certifications that patents that 
are invalid or not infringed, 
known as Paragraph IV certifica-
tions, allow the brand-name 
drug maker to sue the generics 
manufacturer to resolve questions 
of validity and infringement. As 
a result, FDA approval of the ge-
neric drug can be delayed for up 
to 30 months pending legal reso-
lution.
Orange Book listings can in-
clude both product patents on 
small-molecule chemicals and pat-
ents on methods of use for treat-
ing particular conditions. FDA 
regulations require that, in addi-
tion to patent numbers and expi-
ration dates, method-of-use pat-
ents must have “use codes” that 
describe their scope.
Frequently, the main product 
patent on a brand-name drug ex-
pires before the use patents do. 
In that case, FDA regulations 
based on Hatch–Waxman allow 
generics firms the option of fil-
ing a “section viii statement,” 
which “carves out” from the ge-
neric label those uses on which 
the brand-name firm still has 
patents. If the FDA finds this 
narrower labeling acceptable from 
the standpoint of safety and ef-
ficacy, the generic version has a 
potential path to market.
Brand-name drug manufactur-
ers have sometimes tried to sue 
to prevent market entry by gener-
ics companies that file section 
viii statements, typically arguing 
that although a generics firm 
may not be directly infringing a 
use patent, it should be prohibit-
ed from marketing its product 
because such marketing will in-
evitably “induce” infringement. 
In other words, the generic-sub-
stitution practices of doctors and 
pharmacists — encouraged by 
FDA approval of “carved-out” ge-
nerics as fully substitutable for 
brand-name drugs and by laws 
in many states — will inevitably 
lead to prescription of generic 
drugs for patented uses. More-
over, brand-name pharmaceuti-
cal firms argue that generics 
firms should be held liable be-
cause they are well aware that 
their products will be prescribed 
and dispensed in an infringing 
manner.
The Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit, the intermediate 
appellate court for patent cases, 
has held that as a procedural 
matter, courts may hear suits 
brought by brand-name firms in 
response to a section viii state-
ment filing. However, it has gen-
erally rejected the substantive 
claim of induced infringement, 
holding that because inducement 
requires more than mere knowl-
edge that infringement is occur-
ring, the generics firm cannot be 
held liable unless it specifically 
promoted the drug for a carved-
out use.1
In recent years, carve-out label-
ing has assumed a prominent 
role in facilitating market entry 
of generics. For example, in fis-
cal year 2010, the FDA approved 
11 generic drugs with carve-out 
labeling. In fact, 3 of the 5 top-
selling brand-name drugs that 
“went generic” that year did so as 
a consequence of such labeling.2
On occasion, brand-name drug 
manufacturers have attempted to 
defeat carve-out attempts by list-
ing use codes that substantially 
exceed the scope of the use pat-
ent. This tactic can be effective, 
since the FDA does not evaluate 
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representations of patent infor-
mation in use codes.3
In April 2012, however, the Su-
preme Court issued a decision en-
abling generics firms to challenge 
the submission to the FDA of 
overly broad use claims. In Caraco, 
Novo Nordisk’s only unexpired 
patent covered a relatively narrow 
use — treating non–insulin-depen-
dent diabetes by combining its 
diabetes drug repaglinide with 
another drug, metformin. In the 
Orange Book, however, Novo Nor-
disk listed a much broader use 
code that covered all methods for 
“improving glycemic control in 
adults with type 2 diabetes mel-
litus,” thereby denying generics 
firms a meaningful carve-out.
The key question in this case 
was whether amendments to 
Hatch–Waxman implemented in 
2003 allowed generics firms, in the 
course of a patent-infringement 
lawsuit brought by the brand-
name company, to file a counter-
claim to correct overly broad list-
ings of Orange Book use codes. 
The unanimous opinion of the 
Court, delivered by Justice Elena 
Kagan, held that the amend-
ments were indeed intended to 
correct such overbreadth. As Ka-
gan noted, absent the ability to 
correct overbreadth, a company 
could not market a generic drug 
for noninfringing uses.
As a matter of statutory inter-
pretation, the Supreme Court de-
cision is correct. Both the lan-
guage and legislative history of 
the 2003 amendments indicate 
that Congress intended to con-
trol inaccurate Orange Book list-
ing practices with respect to 
product patents and method-of-
use patents. Such misleading prac-
tices had been thoroughly docu-
mented in a 2002 Federal Trade 
Commission report. However, as 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s con-
currence points out, the mecha-
nism provided by Congress is far 
from optimal. A claim to correct 
overbreadth can be filed only if 
the generics firm chooses to pro-
voke litigation by filing a Para-
graph IV certification and the 
brand-name firm then sues for 
infringement. An administrative 
approach to determining the ac-
curacy of Orange Book listings 
— an approach in which the FDA 
might, for example, consult with 
the Patent and Trademark Office 
— would clearly be more efficient.
Lurking behind these techni-
cal legal disputes over carve-outs, 
induced infringement, and overly 
broad Orange Book listings is the 
broader policy issue of providing 
incentives to search for new uses. 
Brand-name pharmaceutical com-
panies argue that the pervasive 
distribution of generic drugs for 
patented uses substantially under-
mines the efficacy of such pat-
ents and hence the incentives for 
finding other uses.4
Strong incentives are probably 
unnecessary for purposes of gen-
erating hypotheses regarding new 
uses. The heavy prevalence of 
off-label prescribing — which ac-
counted for more than 20% of 
prescriptions written by office-
based physicians in 2001, accord-
ing to one study 5 — suggests 
that hypotheses are pervasive. 
The incentives question is impor-
tant, however, because the ulti-
mate objective, from the stand-
point of both patient welfare and 
cost, is reliable evidence of effi-
cacy. Such evidence, which is re-
quired before the FDA can approve 
labeling (or allow marketing) for 
a new use, is generated through 
investment in well-designed trials.
Such investment need not 
emerge, however, only from indi-
vidual firms operating in secrecy 
and motivated by patents. Indeed, 
one recent study found that pub-
licly funded research formed the 
foundation for almost all the new-
use FDA approvals that were exam-
ined.6 Going forward, the public 
sector’s role is likely to increase 
— the new National Center for 
Advancing Translational Sciences 
at the National Institutes of Health 
has explicitly embraced the search 
for new uses in a number of the 
programs it is funding.
In many arenas of innovation, 
proprietary research models sup-
ported by intellectual property 
and publicly funded open research 
models not only coexist, they 
play mutually reinforcing, syner-
gistic roles. Brand-name firms 
could view Caraco’s partial restric-
tion on their deployment of over-
ly broad use claims as an oppor-
tunity to rely less on dubious 
legal tactics and more on the pur-
suit of opportunities to leverage 
public-sector investment.
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If the main product patent on a brand-name 
drug expires before the use patents do,  
generics firms can apply to the FDA to  
“carve out” patented uses from the generic 
label and potentially gain a path to market.
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